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1 Nietzsche’s Metaethics?
A natural entrée into Nietzsche’s views on ethics and normativity is by way of an
interpretive puzzle. Some of Nietzsche’s claims about value can seem puzzling when
seen alongside his expressions of his own values. It is surprising when the same
person who writes
We have thought the matter over and finally decided that there is noth-
ing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but
that there are states of soul in which we impose such words upon things
external to and within us. (D 210)1
also— in the same book even!—writes
It goes without saying that I do not deny—unless I am a fool— that
many actions called immoral ought to be avoided and resisted, or that
many called moral ought to be done and encouraged. (D 103)
1I use the following standard acronyms when citing Nietzsche’s texts: TheAntichrist (A); Beyond
Good and Evil (BGE);TheBirth of Tragedy (BT);TheCase ofWagner (CW);Daybreak (D); Ecce Homo
(EH); On the Genealogy of Morality (GM); The Gay Science (GS); Human, All-Too-Human (HH);
Nietzsche contra Wagner (NCW); Twilight of the Idols (TI); Untimely Meditations (UM); Thus Spoke
Zarathustra (Z). I cite The Wanderer and His Shadow, incorporated as Part II of Volume II of HH,
as WS. I use Roman numerals to refer to major parts and chapters (if there are any), and Arabic
numerals to refer to sections. Regarding Nietzsche’s Nachlass, if a note is included in The Will to
Power (as decided by later editors), I cite it asWP. If it isn’t included, I cite it by the volume, notebook
number, and note number in Colli & Montinari 1980 (KSA). I include the year for all notes.
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One might not expect the same philosopher to say that “nature is always value-less”
(GS 301) and also declaim that those who posit an ideal world “rob reality of its
meaning, value, and truthfulness” (EH P:2; emphasis mine)—or, more colorfully,
that the Christian church is “the highest of all conceivable corruptions” and “has
turned every value into an un-value, every truth into a lie, every integrity into a
vileness of the soul” (A 62).
On the one hand, Nietzsche makes claims to the effect that there are no evalua-
tive facts (consider: “error theorist,” “nihilist”). On the other hand, he ardently en-
gages in evaluative discourse and recommends an evaluative perspective. The puzzle
is how a philosopher of Nietzsche’s pedigree, acuity, and self-awareness could take
up such a normative and metanormative stance. If Nietzsche thinks that there are
no evaluative facts, is he being insincere when expressing his endorsement of cer-
tain values and rejection of others? Can one honestly accept and recommend an
evaluative perspective while denying that anything is valuable in itself?
This puzzle— even if not articulated in precisely this way—has prompted sig-
nificant recent interest in Nietzsche’s metaethics. This may also seem surprising:
Metaethics as a field of inquiry didn’t even begin to come into its own until the mid-
20th century. Nietzschemay have been ahead of his time on some philosophical and
psychological matters; but can we really expect to discern a coherent normative and
metanormative perspective in Nietzsche’s writings? Interpreting Nietzsche is hard
enough as it is. Is investigating Nietzsche’s metaethics, even if he had one, likely to
be theoretically fruitful?
We shouldn’t despair at the possibility of delineating metaethical views in Niet-
zsche’s writings (cf. Wilcox 1974: 201; Reginster 2006: 100; Hussain 2011: 12, 52–
53). Indeed, the principal question which will concern us here— the question of the
attitude-(in)dependence of value, what some have regarded as the central metaeth-
ical question (cf. Street 2008b: 222–4)—goes back most famously to Plato (think:
Euthyphro). Interpretive caution will certainly be in order. We shouldn’t expect Ni-
etzsche to have a complete metaethical theory, or to articulate his views with the
systematicity that characterizes contemporary discussions. But I hope to show that
by ascribing certain metaethical views to Nietzsche we can make better sense of the
character and content of his writings than we otherwise would. Nietzsche provides a
compelling example of how metanormative inquiry can undergird normative eval-
uation in practice.
Metaethics— andmetanormative theory generally— investigates metaphysical,
epistemological, semantic, and psychological issues about normative language and
judgment; it examines thought and talk about what we ought to do, how to live,
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what is good, beautiful, wrong, fitting, etc.2 For instance: What part of reality, if
any, is such thought and talk about? How does this part of reality, if there is one,
fit in with other parts of reality? How do we have knowledge of it? How should
we explain the conventional meaning of normative language? What is the nature of
normative judgment? Examining the above interpretive puzzlewill provide a natural
entryway intoNietzsche’s potential views on such questions. Iwill focus primarily on
matters concerning the nature and grounds of normativity, though we will see that
interpreters have ascribed to Nietzsche views on the broader range of metaethical
questions.
The chapter is organized as follows: §2 lays out our interpretive puzzle in greater
detail. §3 examines what is perhaps the most prominent response: Nadeem Hus-
sain’s (2007) interpretation of Nietzsche as a revolutionary fictionalist. Hussain’s
discussion highlights important connections, for Nietzsche, between art, practical
nihilism, and value creation. Yet I will argue that a fictionalist interpretation faces
pressing challenges. §4 offers what I regard as an improved constructivist inter-
pretation, developed elsewhere (Silk 2015b). Values, on this view, are treated as
grounded purely in facts about creatures’ evaluative attitudes. Finally, §5 briefly
considers several alternative subjectivist realist, constitutivist, and non-cognitivist
interpretations. Examining these views will help clarify the connection, for Niet-
zsche, between value and evaluative attitudes. A more nuanced understanding of
the space of metaethical theories brings into relief a more plausible normative and
metanormative view that we can attribute to Nietzsche.
2 The puzzle
A persistent theme throughout Nietzsche’s writings is that nothing has value “in it-
self ” and, consequently, that evaluative judgments involve a kind of error. Though
Nietzsche often focuses his attacks on specifically moral properties and claims,3 his
critiques, even throughout his mature period, seem to extend to all normative prop-
erties and claims. In addition to D 210 and GS 301 (see §1), consider: “What means
do we have for making things beautiful, attractive, and desirable when they are not?
2A distinction is sometimes made between deontic or normative terms (‘must’, ‘permissible’)
and evaluative terms (‘good’, ‘beautiful’). It isn’t uncontroversial how these families of terms are re-
lated, either in general or for Nietzsche. I will use ‘normative’ and ‘evaluative’ indiscriminately to
cover notions in both families. No harm will come from this since Nietzsche’s apparently nihilistic
metanormative claims are about both types, and his positive substantive claims use both types of
terms. I won’t distinguish between metaethics and metanormative theory more generally.
3See, e.g., HH 4; D 103; BGE 108; CW E; TI VII:1; WP 428 [1888].
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And in themselves I think they never are!” (GS 299). Hence, there is a “necessary
injustice” (HH P:6, 32–33) in evaluative judgments.⁴
As a counterpoint to these apparently “nihilistic” claims, Nietzsche expresses his
own evaluative views and even calls for the “creation” of new values. One of Niet-
zsche’s primary concerns is what he calls the revaluation of values. The negative
part of this project, the critique of morality, is well known (if not always well under-
stood). But Nietzsche’s positive injunction for the “philosophers of the future” to fill
the evaluative void and create new values—new life-affirming values that express
the “ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant Yes to life” (EH BT:2)— is
just as important, perhaps more important, to his overall vision. Not all evalua-
tive judgments are treated on a par, for Nietzsche. “Beyond Good and Evil.—At
least this does not mean ‘Beyond Good and Bad’ ” (GM I:17). Nietzsche critiques
morality, “but why? Out of morality! Or what else should we call that which informs
it— and us?… But there is no doubt that a ‘thou shalt’ still speaks to us too, that
we too still obey a stern law set over us (D P:4). Though “[f]ree of morality,” “when
the conscious mind has attained its highest degree of freedom it is involuntarily led
to” “the individual virtues, moderation, justice, repose of soul” (WS 212). Nietzsche
not only takes up a particular normative perspective, but also regards it as warranted
or fitting, and disagrees with people accepting alternative views: Christian morality
“reverse[s]” “the concepts of ‘true’ and ‘false’…: whatever is most harmful to life is
called ‘true’; whatever elevates it, enhances, affirms, justifies it, makes it triumphant,
is called ‘false’ ” (A 9). Apparently, Nietzsche regards some values as having genuine
normative authority.⁵
Whence their normative authority? One of Nietzsche’s favored metaphors—
metaphors?— is to treat these values as created. It is the task of the “new philoso-
phers,” the “philosophers of the future” (BGE 42, 44, 203)— as heralded by the
“higher types” (BGE 62; A 4; EH III:1, IV:4) and “free spirits” (GS 347; BGE ch. 2)—
to be “creators…whowrite new values on new tablets” (Z P:9).⁶ “He who determines
values… is the highest man” (WP 999 [1884]); he is “value-creating” (BGE 260).
“That anything at all is good and evil— that is his creation” (Z III:12.2).⁷ What is
⁴See also D 3; GS 115; Z I:12,15, II:12; BGE P; TI II:2; A 11;WP 12 [1888], 25 [1887], 565 [1886],
789 [1885–1886].
⁵See also, e.g., D 103, 104, 556; GS 290, 335; BGE 23, 44, 56, 187, 202, 225, 257, 259, 262, 284,
293; GM P:3,5,6, I:12, II:2; A 2, 9, 11, 57, 62; TI V:4,6, IX:35; EH IV:4,7,8; WP 250 [1887], 382 [1887,
1888], 674 [1887–1888], 858 [1888].
⁶It isn’t obvious how Nietzsche understands the relation between these categories of individuals.
For consistency I will say that it’s the free spiritswhomNietzsche enjoins to create new values, and it’s
the new philosophers, a subclass of free spirits and higher types, who create such values.
⁷See alsoGWVI: 336 [1873]; GS 55, 290, 320, 335, 347; Z I:1, I:8, I:17, II:2, II:12, III:11, III.12.16;
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special about the new philosophers isn’t simply that they come to value new things.
If people began valuing things that harmed the higher types and prevented human
flourishing and excellence, Nietzsche wouldn’t be quite so enthusiastic. Call a value
genuine if it makes legitimate claims on us, if it is genuinely normative; to call a value
‘genuine’ in this sense is to express one’s endorsement of it. What Nietzsche is sug-
gesting is that the new philosophers create new genuine values: values that afford
a critical, authoritative perspective on how to act, feel, and be. This is what distin-
guishes the new philosophers’ revaluation of values from the slaves’ revaluation of
values in the slave revolt (GM I).
Although human beings have conferred value on things (in some manner to be
explained), not just any human beings or values will do. Nietzsche took there to be
epistemic and psychological constraints on value creation. It is ameasure of strength
or greatness how much “terrible insight into reality” (EH Z:6) one can bear and af-
firm: “Error… is not blindness, error is cowardice” (EH P:3). Nietzsche’s higher type
“conceives reality as it is, being strong enough to do so” (EH IV:5). In a section ti-
tled “Intellectual conscience,” Nietzsche warns against having and living according to
beliefs “without first becoming aware of the final and most certain reasons pro and
con” (GS 2). The new philosopher’s values must be informed by, or at least consis-
tent with, the sciences, and reflect the discipline of the scientificmethod. The created
values must embody insights from many perspectives. Occupying different, possi-
bly opposed points of view is a “precondition” for the new philosopher’s ultimate
“task”: to “create values” (BGE 211).⁸
In sum, our interpretive puzzle is this: Though (a) Nietzsche claims that nothing
has value in itself, (b) he engages in normative discourse, endorsing certain values
and rejecting others, and (c) enjoins the free spirits to create new values, (d) values
that must meet certain conditions for them to have genuine normative authority.
BGE 203, 211; A 11, 13; EH IV:1; WP 260 [1883–1888], 972 [1884], 979 [1885].
⁸See also BT SC 7; WS 44; HH P:6; D 45; GS P:3, 11, 110, 123, 283–284, 290, 335; Z II:22.2,
IV:15; BGE 30, 39, 227–230, 284; GM I:10,13, II:24, III:12; TI X:2; A 50, 54; EH BT:2, IV:1, IV:3; WP
172 [1887], 1041 [1888]. See Wilcox 1974, Richardson 1996, 2004, Leiter 2002, Hussain 2007, Silk
2015b for further discussion of Nietzsche’s constraints on value creation. Though Nietzsche grants
that having false beliefs can sometimes be necessary for preserving and promoting life (e.g., UM II:I;
GS 111, 121; BGE 4, 11, 34–35), hismisgivings about the value of truth and knowledge aremisgivings
about their unconditional and unquestioned value.
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3 Nietzschean fictionalism?
Nadeem Hussain argues, in an influential series of papers, that interpreting Niet-
zsche as a revolutionary fictionalist best resolves the sort of interpretive puzzle from
§2 (see esp. Hussain 2007, also 2011, 2012a; cf. Reginster 2006). In this section I will
describe and raise several challenges for Hussain’s fictionalist interpretation. In the
next section I will argue that a constructivist interpretation provides an improved
account of Nietzsche’s evaluative and metanormative perspective.
Revolutionary fictionalism starts with an error theory about our current norma-
tive thought and talk. The error theory consists of a semantic claim and ametaphysi-
cal claim. The semantic claim is that normative predicates conventionally purport to
refer to attitude-independent normative properties— roughly, properties which can
hold of something independently of the evaluative attitudes of any relevant agent
(or agents). The metaphysical claim is that there are no attitude-independent nor-
mative properties. So, the error theorist concludes, all ascriptions of normative
predicates— e.g., all sentences of the form N(x), for normative predicate N—are
systematically untrue. The revolutionary fictionalist proposes that we replace this
problematic evaluative practice with a practice that doesn’t involve a commitment
to attitude-independent normative properties. On the specific formof revolutionary
fictionalism Hussain ascribes to Nietzsche, the free spirits are to engage in “a sim-
ulacrum of valuing”: “Nietzsche’s recommended practice is a form of make-believe
or pretence. Nietzsche’s free spirits pretend to value something by regarding it as
valuable in itself while knowing that in fact it is not valuable in itself ” (2007: 170).
Crucial to motivating Hussain’s fictionalist interpretation is the connection, for
Nietzsche, betweenpractical nihilism, art, and value creation. Rather than succumb-
ing to total despair in response to “the ultimate goallessness of man” (HH 33)— the
belief that nothing is valuable in itself— the free spirits are to “learn from artists”
(GS 299) for it is they who will “know how to console themselves” (HH 33). Specifi-
cally, according to Hussain’s interpretation, the free spirits are to learn how to gener-
ate “honest illusions,” or how to regard things as valuable in themselves even while
knowing that they aren’t. It’s in terms of such attitudes of “regarding as valuable”
that Hussain understands Nietzsche’s injunctions for the free spirits to create val-
ues. The free spirits are to “create” values in the sense that they are to replace their
practice of believing that certain things are valuable in themselves with a practice of
regarding new things as valuable in themselves, without believing that they are.
I have two main worries for Hussain’s fictionalist interpretation: first, that its
ascription of an error theory to Nietzsche is undermotivated; second, that invoking
a practice of honest illusions fails to capture Nietzsche’s claims about value creation.
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Start with the error theory. Hussain claims that attributing an error theory toNi-
etzsche is necessary to capture the apparent systematicity of Nietzsche’s rejection of
normative claims (Hussain 2007: 161–3; 2011: 46–50; 2012a). If we interpret Niet-
zsche as rejecting error theory, and accepting that values are fundamentally attitude-
dependent (hereafter “accepting attitude-dependence”)
attitude-dependence
Normative properties (if there are any) are ultimately groundedpurely in prop-
erties of agents’ evaluative attitudes (perhaps in conjunction with the non-
normative facts about the relevant circumstances).⁹
we must “[interpret] him as having contradictory views” (2012a: 103).
The inference from “Nietzsche rejects ascriptions of attitude-independent nor-
mative properties” to “Nietzsche accepts an error theory about normative language”
is too quick. It would be easy to decry the fetishization and reification of value in the
manner characteristic of error theorists, as Nietzsche does, without having a sophis-
ticated semantic view about whether normative predicates conventionally purport
to refer to attitude-independent normative properties. But it is crucial for the moti-
vation of a fictionalist replacement of our ordinary evaluative practice that one does
have such a view. It is only if a term couldn’t be an normative term unless it referred
to an attitude-independent property that any linguistic practice in which speakers
used normative terms—or at least terms that are homophonous with our normative
terms—without assuming attitude-independence would be incompatible with our
current linguistic practice (cf. Campbell 2014: 477). The problem is that it is likely
anachronistic to interpret Nietzsche as having this sort of sophisticated semantic
view.1⁰
Themetaethical questions of principal interest toNietzsche aren’t semantic ques-
tions—questions about the conventional meaning of normative language. They are
broadlymetaphysical questions about the nature of normative properties. What Ni-
etzsche is denying in the apparent error-theoretic passages is that there are attitude-
independent normative properties. Perhaps, in light of certain speakers’ acceptance
of attitude-independence, many normative claims have assumed a false and psy-
chologically deficient view of the world. But this is insufficient for an error theory.
⁹Henceforth I will leave the qualifier concerning the relevant circumstances implicit. For the
moment, by ‘evaluative attitude’ I mean any attitude that tends to motivate an agent when combined
with her ordinary factual beliefs; thus not all evaluative attitudes in this sense need concern values.
1⁰Cf. Leiter 2000: 278–9, 2002: 137n.17, 2008, 2011; Sinhababu 2007: 264n.1; Hussain 2011: 39,
2012b: 131.
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One can accept a metaphysics on which nothing is valuable independent of agents’
evaluative attitudes, while being neutral on the semantics of whether our linguistic
conventions assume otherwise.
Now turn to the Nietzschean fictionalist’s proposed replacement linguistic prac-
tice. Recall Nietzsche’s injunctions for the free spirits to create values (§2). Niet-
zsche’s task is to transform reality: it is to “mak[e] things” valuable even though
they aren’t valuable “in themselves” (GS 299). It is puzzling why Hussain regards
a fictionalist interpretation as well-placed to capture talk about value creation. Pre-
tending to value doesn’t create values any more than riding around cackling on a
broom creates a witch. A fictionalist interpretation thus obscures Nietzsche’s claims
that there are values and that the new philosophers (in some sense to be explained)
make this the case: “Whatever has value in the present world has […] been given,
granted value, and we were the givers and granters!” (GS 301). Indeed, because of
its commitment to error theory, fictionalism is inconsistent with these claims.
Hussain’s discussions shed new light on the connections among art, avoiding
practical nihilism, and value creation. But, I will argue, Nietzsche’s views on these
connections needn’t call for a fictionalist interpretation.
Nietzsche is intent on highlighting pervasive, and what he regards as deeply
problematic, features of our evaluative practices. Certain of our values and beliefs
are deeply engrained by thousands of years of selection pressures favoringwhatNiet-
zsche calls the “herd instinct”— roughly, our disposition to copy others and develop
habits, practices, feelings, beliefs, and values that favor the survival or expansion of
our social group. One such belief is the belief that our values are unconditional and
apply independently of us and our attitudes. Distrusting individuality, we become
reluctant to take responsibility for our values, and fail to see our attitudes as suffi-
cient to ground their normativity. We need an external authority to sanction our
values as making legitimate demands on us.
But up to now themoral law has been supposed to stand above our own
likes and dislikes: one did not want actually to impose this law upon
oneself, one wanted to take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere
or have it commanded to one from somewhere. (D 108)
[We have an] old habit of supposing that the goal must be put up, given,
demanded from outside—by some superhuman authority. Having un-
learned faith in that, one still follows the old habit and seeks another
authority that can speak unconditionally and command goals and tasks
[…] One wants to get around the will, the willing of a goal, the risk of
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positing a goal for oneself; one wants to rid oneself of the responsibility.
(WP 20 [1887])11
Positing an agent-external sanction for our values not only allows us to avoid taking
responsibility for them; it makes it possible for us to regard them as having norma-
tive force at all. The belief that certain things are good in themselves, though an
“erroneous [article] of faith,” “almost [becomes] part of the basic endowment of the
species” (GS 110). Our evaluative experience even comes to have a quasi-perceptual
character: “Our world” becomes “colored by [moral evaluations]” (WP 260 [1883–
1888]; cf. n. 17).12
Given our entrenchedpsycho-social commitment to attitude-independence, deny-
ing that there are attitude-independent values poses a serious threat. It “emaciates
the fundamental drives and desires that provide psychological unity and strength to
the agent” (2011: 14). Overcoming this sort of psychological response— practical
nihilism—is by no means inevitable (BGE 203).13 From his earliest writings Niet-
zsche is adamant about the importance of art in responding to this threat of nihilism.
As we have seen, when confronted with the realization that nothing has value in it-
self, “we should learn from artists” (GS 299) for it is they who will “know how to
console themselves” (HH 33). How is it that Nietzsche thinks art can help?
First, we can agree with Hussain that art can play a palliative role for the free
spirits. The project of genealogy and the ruthless skepticism it demands can be psy-
chologically destabilizing. “At every step one has to wrestle for truth […] That re-
quires greatness of soul: the service of truth is the hardest service” (A 50). Art, and
the enjoyment of its illusions, can serve as a break from the truth project.
Our ultimate gratitude to art.—Had we not approved of the arts and
invented this type of cult of the untrue, the insight into general untruth
and mendacity that is now given to us by science […] would be utterly
unbearable. Honesty would lead to nausea and suicide. But now our
honesty has a counterforce that helps us avoid such consequences: art,
as the good will to appearance […] As an aesthetic phenomenon exis-
tence is still bearable to us […] At times we need to have a rest from
11See also D 9; GS 143; BGE 2, 261–262; GM II:2; A 54; WP 975 [1885–1886].
12See also HH 3, 4; GS 1, 107, 301; CW E; WP 505 [1885–1886]. For discussion see Poellner
2007, 2012, Anderson 2012, Katsafanas 2013b. See also Mandelbaum 1955 for an insightful, though
often neglected, discussion in the ethics literature.
13For extensive discussion of the threat of nihilism, see Reginster 2006. See also Kaufmann 1974:
ch. 3; Nehamas 1985: 70–72, 91, 123–4, 144–5; Langsam 1997: 238–45; Richardson 2004: 254–5,
260; Hussain 2007: 161, 166–7, 2011: 14–15, 50.
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ourselves by looking at and down at ourselves and, from an artistic dis-
tance, laughing at ourselves or crying at ourselves; we have to discover
the hero no less than the fool in our passion for knowledge; wemust now
and then be pleased about our folly in order to be able to stay pleased
about our wisdom! And precisely because we are at bottom grave and
serious human beings and more weights than human beings, nothing
does us as much good as the fool’s cap: we need it against ourselves—
we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and blissful
art lest we lose that freedom over things that our ideal demands of us. It
would be a relapse for us, with our irritable honesty, to get completely
caught up inmorality and, for the sake of the overly severe demands that
we there make on ourselves, to become virtuous monsters and scare-
crows. (GS 107)
However, appreciating art in this way needn’t involve “experienc[ing] the evaluative
illusion” (Hussain 2007: 171) of pretending that there are attitude-independent val-
ues. Even in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s vision is of an “artistic Socrates” (BT
14; cf. GS P:3–4; WP 795 [1885–1886]). The appreciation of “appearance as appear-
ance” (KSA 7.29[17] [1873]) is in the service of the truth project, and is subject to a
higher-order aim for truth.1⁴
Our discussion of Nietzsche’s epistemic constraints on value creation (§2) high-
lights an important shortcoming in fictionalist interpretations. Hussainmay be right
that having honest fictions is compatible with striving for truth (2007: 168–70. But
consider the force of Nietzsche’s praises of epistemic honesty and courage and cor-
responding denunciations of self-deception. And consider the lengths to which Ni-
etzsche goes to disabuse us of our belief in attitude-independence, a belief that Ni-
etzsche takes to be as dangerous as it is deeply engrained (D 9, 108; GS 110; WP 20
[1887]; more on this below). It would be surprising at best if Nietzsche’s ultimate
positive injunction for the free spirits was then for them to act as if they were too
weak to “assume the right to new values…, the most terrifying assumption for a rev-
erent spirit” (Z I:1), and had “rid [themselves] of the responsibility… of positing a
goal for [themselves]” (WP 20 [1887]; cf. n. 11). Fictionalism is incongruous with
these features of Nietzsche’s writings.
Though Hussain rightly emphasizes the palliative role of art in responding to
practical nihilism, this isn’t Nietzsche’s only, or even primary, purpose for art. Art,
1⁴See also BT 5, 24; HHP:1; GS P:4, 299, 301; GM III:25; TI IX:24. Thedevelopment ofNietzsche’s
views on the relation between art and truth is complex, and I cannot do justice to it here. See esp.
Young 1992.
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construed as a break from the truth project, only has a purpose given our psycho-
logical constraints. The strongest individuals wouldn’t need a break from the diffi-
culties caused by knowledge of the truths uncovered by genealogy, nor would they
even want such a break. We need amore complete picture of the various roles for art
in Nietzsche’s positive project of creating new values. Before addressing this issue, I
would like to get an alternative response to our interpretive puzzle on the table. In
the next section I will argue that the proposed alternative interpretation elucidates
a further, often underappreciated, role for art.
4 Nietzschean constructivism
The last section identified several challenges facing a fictionalist response to our in-
terpretive puzzle from §2. First, attributing an error theory to Nietzsche is under-
motivated by the textual evidence. Nietzsche’s claims that nothing is valuable in
itself needn’t imply a semantic view about the conventional meaning of normative
language. Second, a fictionalist interpretation cannot take at face value Nietzsche’s
claims about value creation. Fictionalism’s metaphysics is in tension with the idea
that the free spirits genuinely create values. We should prefer an interpretation that
captures how certain things are genuinely valuable— though not “in themselves”—
and how the free spirits are somehow responsible for this. Further, though there is
an important connection, for Nietzsche, between art and value creation, we need
an interpretation that allows art to play more than a palliative role. Value creation
is initiated, not out of weakness and as a break from the truth project, but out of
strength and as a component of it.
These difficulties facing fictionalist interpretations provide desiderata for a more
adequate account. In this section Iwill argue that interpretingNietzsche as ametaeth-
ical constructivist better captures the features of his normative and metanormative
position discussed in §§2–3. The aim isn’t to develop this interpretation in detail;
I begin that task elsewhere (Silk 2015b). The goal is simply to introduce a promis-
ing, and often neglected, interpretive option, and to delineate some of its potential
features. I leave developments of the general kind of constructivist interpretation
described here for future work.
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4.1 Metaethical constructivism: What?
Constructivism, as I will understand it, is a metaethical view about the nature of
normative properties in general.1⁵ Constructivism doesn’t merely make an exten-
sionality claim about what has value, as expressible by a biconditional of the form
“X is valuable iff…”. Nor does it simply make an epistemological claim about what
probilifies normative truths, or a supervenience claim about what fixes normative
truths. Rather, constructivism answers the following sorts of questions: Fundamen-
tally, what, if anything, grounds that something is non-instrumentally valuable? Or
that something is a reason for someone to do something? The notions of fundamen-
tality and ground at play are metaphysical; they are the same as those used in claims
like that Socrates is more fundamental than his singleton {Socrates}, that physical
properties ground mental properties, etc. Constructivism is a metaphysical view
about what it is to be good, wrong, desirable, etc.
Constructivism treats normative properties as attitude-dependent in the sense
from §3: it treats normative facts as grounded in facts about the (possibly counter-
factual) evaluative attitudes of agents. Normative facts are nothing “over and above”
facts about agents’ evaluative attitudes. What makes a normative judgment correct
is that it coheres with the relevant agent’s (or agents’) evaluative attitudes, where
constructivist theories may differ on what agent is (or class of agents are) “relevant”
and what the relevant sense of “coherence” is. Treating values as grounded in agents’
evaluative attitudes leaves room for how agents can be normativelymistaken, though
only in certain ways. What an agent values and what she has reason to promote can
come apart, but only if she is mistaken about the relevant evaluative attitudes (or
perhaps about the non-normative facts (§3)).
This general characterization of metaethical constructivism raises many ques-
tions. For instance: What is the relevant agent or class of agents whose evaluative
attitudes ground normative facts? What is the exact grounding relation between the
normative facts and the facts about agents’ evaluative attitudes? What is the relevant
sense in which correct normative judgments “cohere” with the relevant evaluative
attitudes? For present purposes we can leave open Nietzsche’s views, to the extent
he had any, on such questions (see Silk 2015b: §4 for discussion). While Nietzsche
1⁵I will focus primarily on practical normative properties. The label ‘constructivism’ has been
applied to various kinds of views, not all of which may count as constructivist in my sense. Though I
will couch the discussion in terms of the notion of ground, this is inessential. Readers who prefer to
understand these issues in other termsmay recast the discussion accordingly (e.g., in terms of reduc-
tion, constitution, identity). For developments and critical discussion of metaethical constructivism,
see, e.g., Korsgaard 1996, Street 2008a, 2010, Lenman & Shemmer 2012.
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may not have had a fully worked out constructivist theory, in the remainder of this
section I will argue that attributing to Nietzsche even just a general form of con-
structivism elucidates various aspects of his overall evaluative perspective.
4.2 Solving the interpretive puzzle
InterpretingNietzsche as ametaethical constructivist provides an improved response
to our interpretive puzzle from §2. First, we can make sense of Nietzsche’s claims
that nothing is valuable in itself, i.e., independent of agents’ attitudes. The construc-
tivist wholeheartedly agrees that values don’t “constitute the essence and heart of
things” (HH 4), that they are not “eternal and unconditioned” (GS 115), and so on.
There are no normative facts that hold independently of human evaluative attitudes.
Second, despite denying that there are attitude-independent normative prop-
erties, constructivism still affirms that there are normative properties. Attitude-
dependent properties aren’t second-rate as properties. If we interpret Nietzsche as
accepting attitude-dependence, there is nothing curious about his emphatic engage-
ment in normative discourse, his endorsements and rejections of various values, or
his reliance on a distinction between “higher” and “lower” value systems. Even if
there cannot be attitude-independent reasons for adopting one value over another,
there can be genuine reasons all the same. Values needn’t have an agent-external
source to be genuinely normative.
Third, constructivism provides a precise interpretation of Nietzsche’s claims that
the new philosophers “create” values. The new philosophers create values not in the
sense that they invent or elicit new evaluative attitudes at will. This would be psycho-
logically implausible and philosophically suspect. Values exert genuine normative
force; they govern the will. Rather, Nietzsche’s talk of value creation can be under-
stood metaphysically in terms of attitude-dependence. There is a question of what
the precise class of agents is, according to Nietzsche, whose attitudes ground nor-
mative facts, but at minimum it’s clear that the new philosophers are among them.
Insofar as values are grounded in the new philosophers’ evaluative attitudes, there is
a real sense in which the new philosophers can create genuine values. By coming to
value new things in the descriptive sense—by coming to have evaluative attitudes
toward different objects— the new philosophers can thereby create values in the
normative sense—values that make legitimate claims on us, those which we ought
to, or have reason to, promote.
In this way, interpreting Nietzsche as a metaethical constructivist helps make
sense of the seemingly conflicting aspects of his normative andmetanormative stance.
We can reconcile Nietzsche’s claims that nothing is valuable in itself with his engage-
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ment in normative discourse and his calls for the free spirits to create new genuine
values. This constructivist resolution of our interpretive puzzle avoids the shortcom-
ings of Hussain’s fictionalist account. Constructivism is a metaphysical thesis about
the nature of normativity; it is neutral on (e.g.) the semantics of normative language.
A constructivist interpretation correctly locates Nietzsche’s primary metanormative
interest, not in the conventional meaning of natural language, but in the nature and
metaphysics of value. In what follows I will argue that a constructivist interpretation
also helps capture the further considerations which Hussain appeals to in motivat-
ing his fictionalist interpretation: Nietzsche’s views on practical nihilism, art, and
value creation. A constructivist interpretation can sheds new light on these issues
in the context of Nietzsche’s overall philosophical project.
4.3 Nihilism, art, and value creation
Let’s start by reexamining the contrast between Nietzsche’s apparent error-theoretic
claims and his endorsements of values. Pace Clark & Dudrick 2007, this contrast
isn’t indicative of a shift in Nietzsche’s views or in his target linguistic domain. The
apparently error-theoretic passages continue throughoutNietzsche’s late-periodwrit-
ings (see nn. 3–4), and no particular type of normative claim is vindicated.1⁶ Rather,
I suggest that the relevant shift is dialectical. It is a shift from a negative claim and
resulting question— “Attitude-independence is false! Now what?”— to a positive
response to that question— “Embrace attitude-dependence and create new values!”
An 1888 note is illuminating:
The supreme values inwhose serviceman should live […]— these social
values were erected over man to strengthen their voice, as if they were
commands of God, as “reality,” as the “true” world, as a hope and future
world. Now that the shabby origin of these values is becoming clear,
the universe seems to have lost value, seems “meaningless”—but that
is only a transitional stage. (WP 7 [1888])
Nietzsche’s apparently error-theoretic and nihilistic claims don’t reflect his ultimate
normative ormetanormative view. They characterize a “transitional stage”—namely,
from an acceptance of attitude-independence to a reaffirmation of values consequent
on accepting attitude-dependence. In the first stage, Nietzsche takes on board the
assumption of attitude-independence in order to educe for his audience its nihilistic
implications. If one assumes that genuine values must have an attitude-independent
1⁶For further discussion, see Hussain 2007: 162; 2011: 10, 46–48; 2012a: 115n.14; 2012b: 123–8.
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source, accepting that nothing is valuable in itself raises the threat of disorienta-
tion and despair: “The nihilistic question ‘for what?’ is rooted in the old habit of
supposing that the goal must be put up, given, demanded from outside—by some
[…] authority that can speak unconditionally and command goals and tasks” (WP
20 [1887]). Surveying the apparent “ultimate goallessness of man,” our actions can
acquire “the character of useless squandering”; life can seem “meaningless” (HH33).
This first stage is essential for realizing Nietzsche’s ultimate aim of motivating
the “nascent higher types” (Leiter 2002) into an unqualified affirmation of life. Ni-
etzsche’s crucial contribution is that we can overcome practical nihilism by appre-
ciating that there are values, and that they are “created” by us. Reengaging in nor-
mative discourse and practice requires first embracing a new view about the nature
of value: that value is fundamentally attitude-dependent. We should expect Niet-
zsche to make bald evaluative claims—as he does—when the threat of nihilism
is no longer a live possibility, or at least when he is trying to exclude it from be-
ing treated as a live possibility through his very act of valuing. This latter context is
important. In expressing his values in full awareness of their attitude-dependent sta-
tus, Nietzsche assumes that values can be genuinely normative even if non-objective.
Via a familiar process of conversational accommodation (Stalnaker 2014), Nietzsche
can thereby encourage the nascent higher types to accept this assumption for them-
selves (cf. Silk 2015a: §§3.3.3, 5.2.4). No longer threatened by nihilism, they can then
become free spirits and herald the creation of new values. This initiates a positive
project of creating new life-affirming values, accepted in full view of their metaphys-
ical dependence on human evaluative attitudes. Theoretical inquiry into the nature
of value motivates a practical reformation in how to live.
We saw in §3 how art can play a palliative role in responding to the threat of ni-
hilism. Our constructivist interpretation brings into relief an additional role for art,
the importance of which extends beyond the “transitional stage” of WP 7. We can
“learn from artists” how to engage the affects in securing an acceptance of attitude-
dependence and in effecting changes in others’ evaluative perspectives.
Nietzsche, astute psychologist that he is, realizes that in order to counteract val-
ues, beliefs, habits, etc. entrenched by social selection and the herd instinct, wemust
engage our drives and affects, not just our explicit beliefs. “[I]nasmuch as [rigor-
ous science] is incapable of making any essential inroad into the power of habits
of feeling acquired in primeval times,” it is limited in its ability to affect motivation
(HH 16; cf. GS 301, 345, BGE 264). Even if we come to know propositionally that
attitude-independence is false, the longterm effects of this knowledge throughout
our psyches may be limited. Though we must “learn to think differently,” stability in
reorienting our overall frame of mind requires that we learn “to feel differently” (D
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103; cf. A 54). It is in securing this affective reorientation that art can play a vital
role: “what does all art do? does it not praise? glorify? choose? prefer? With all this
it strengthens or weakens certain valuations […This is] the very presupposition of
the artist’s ability” (TI IX:24). Aesthetic experience engages our drives and affects di-
rectly. Art can thus target the affective roots of our belief in attitude-independence,
and help dislodge it at its physiological/psychological core.1⁷ Learning from artists
how to engage the affects, the free spirits can give causal presence to their belief in
attitude-dependence and solidify their knowledge in new impulses, feelings, habits,
and practices.
This role for art sheds light onNietzsche’s occasional penchant for strong rhetoric.
By expressing his values with his characteristic zeal, Nietzsche can reinforce to the
nascent higher types how values needn’t be independent of human attitudes to have
genuine normative force and authority, and can mitigate the forces threatening the
free spirits’ creative potential: “no longer the humble expressions, ‘everything is
merely subjective,’ but ‘it is also our work!—Let us be proud of it!’ ” (WP 1059
[1884]).1⁸ Nietzsche’s rhetorical style can thus be seen as an instrument in the “task
of assimilating knowledge and making it instinctive” (GS 11; cf. 110, 113). We might
even seeNietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence and the poetically described “amor
fati” in this light: we might see them as mechanisms for solidifying an affirmation
of value without the metaphysical fictions uncovered by genealogy.1⁹ Nietzsche’s
new philosophers aren’t paralyzed by the contingency, risk, and provisionality in
creating values and then fully embracing them.
A constructivist interpretation gives additional meaning to the rhetorical aspect
of Nietzsche’s style. Constructivism treats normative properties as grounded in hu-
man evaluative attitudes. Hence, in changing his readers’ attitudes, Nietzsche may
also change what their normative reasons are, what is genuinely valuable for them,
etc. Given that one can come to value things non-consciously,2⁰ Nietzsche can ef-
fect this normative change without the reader’s even needing to realize it. There is a
benign sense in which such use of rhetoric is par for the course in ethics; it is com-
monplace to use “examples and a bit of tendentious rhetoric” (Railton 2010: 87) to
1⁷See also Z II:15; NCW 2; TI IX:10; WP 800 [1888], 809 [1888]. For discussion of Nietzsche’s
views on the physiology of art, see Moore 2002: ch. 2; Richardson 2004: 227–35. On the affective
roots of moral values, see D 34, 35, 99; GS 57; see also n. 12.
1⁸See also GS 143, 335, 374; Z I:17; BGE 208; WP 568 [1888]. Cf. n. 11.
1⁹See GS 341; Z III:2,13,16, IV:19; BGE 56; TI X:4,5; EH II:10, BT:2,3, Z:1,6. For similar takes,
see Richardson 1996: 256; 2004: 196–7; Langsam 1997: 244–5; Reginster 2006: 13–15, ch. 5; Railton
2012: 46–47. See also Nehamas 1985, Janaway 2007.
2⁰See, e.g., D 119; GS 11, 354; BGE 3, 19, 187; WP 387 [1887–1888], 440 [1888].
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draw one’s audience into one’s evaluative perspective and “pump their intuitions.”
But given Nietzsche’s metaethics, he can be treated as doing something more radi-
cal: changing the attitudes of the free spirits and, in virtue of doing so, changing what
normative facts apply to them.
5 Value creation and evaluative attitudes
So far we have focused on fictionalist and constructivist approaches to certain of
Nietzsche’s views on value and evaluative attitudes. In this section I would like to
briefly examine several alternative interpretive options. This will help clarify the
extent of Nietzsche’s metaethical developments, and situate Nietzsche’s views in the
landscape of contemporary metaethical theories.
First, Paul Katsafanas (2011, 2013a) has argued that we can resolve the interpre-
tive puzzle from §2 by treating Nietzsche as a constitutivist:
[P]ower is not an objective value, in the sense that it would not have
value independently of a particular feature of human activities. Rather,
we are committed to valuing power merely in virtue of acting, because
power is the constitutive aim of action. Thus, power has a privileged
normative status. Moreover, there is a sense in which the value of power
is created by human activity: the structure of our own actions commits
us to valuing power. (2013a: 182; cf. 163)
Insofar as power is the constitutive aim of action, we, as actors, are committed to
its being valuable. Hence, power, though “not an objective value,” has a “privileged
normative status” (2011: 634–5).
Katsafanas’s Nietzschean Constitutivism attempts to justify our commitment to
thinking that power is valuable (cf. 2013a: 1, 238). But an account of what justifies
our commitment to the value of power needn’t imply an account of what grounds
the value of power. Suppose we accept that power is valuable, and that what justi-
fies our thinking this is that power is a constitutive aim of action. This leaves open
the question of what makes it the case that power is valuable. One might treat the
value of power as grounded in our very commitment to it. But such a move, while
natural, isn’t forced upon us. Katsafanas’s Nietzschean Constitutivism is consistent
with the claim that power is valuable because it instantiates some other irreducible,
attitude-independent property. The fact that power is a constitutive aim of action
could justify our commitment to the value of power without being what grounds
the value of power. The constitutive aim might simply track the value of power.
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Hence one might worry whether Katsafanas’s interpretation captures the apparently
metaphysical nature of Nietzsche’s claims about value creation. More needs to be
said to justify that establishing that we are committed to valuing power counts as
establishing that “[we create] the value of power” (2011: 635).
Even if Katsafanas’s constitutivist interpretation doesn’t ultimately resolve our
initial interpretive puzzle, doing so isn’t the only advertised feature of the view.
Katsafanas provides rich developments of various aspects of Nietzsche’s views on
value and evaluative thought— e.g., in ethics, concerning the nature and possible
universality of intrinsic value; in epistemology, concerning what justifies us in ac-
cepting certain values; in action theory, concerning the nature of action and agency;
and in philosophical psychology, concerning the nature of normative judgment, and
the relations among conscious and unconscious valuing, willing, affects, and drives.
Whether the interpretation necessarily provides a metaphysical account of the rela-
tion between value and evaluative attitudes is less clear.
Similar remarks hold for interpretations that might appear to incorporate Niet-
zsche’s valuing of power into a metaethical naturalist account which reduces value
to power (cf. Kaufmann 1974, Wilcox 1974, Schacht 1983, Hunt 1991, Richard-
son 1996, 2004, Langsam 1997, Reginster 2006). It is important to distinguish ax-
iological questions about what is valuable from metaethical questions about what
makes it the case that something is valuable. One could accept that power is the
only non-instrumental value while accepting that what makes this the case is that
power grounds (constitutes, determines, is identical to) the property of being valu-
able (attitude-independent naturalism); or that (certain, all) agentswould value power
in reflective equilibrium (attitude-dependent naturalism); or that power instanti-
ates some irreducibly normative property (non-naturalism). Privileging the value
of (e.g.) power is thus compatible with various types of metaethical naturalism, and
even with non-naturalism. For this reason it isn’t always clear whether the inter-
pretations cited above ascribe to Nietzsche a genuinely metaethical view about the
metaphysics of value. (Richardson 1996 is perhaps clearest on this, referring to Ni-
etzsche’s “external-realist intent.”)
The final kind of interpretation of Nietzsche’smetaethics that I will consider here
is a non-cognitivist interpretation, as defended in Clark & Dudrick 2007.21 To a first
approximation, non-cognitivism claims that normative judgments don’t, by their
nature, represent how the world is. Clark & Dudrick argue that while Nietzsche
21See Hussain 2011, 2012b for further discussion. Non-cognitivism, as I understand it, is princi-
pally a thesis about the nature of normative thought; however, it is typically associated with a broadly
expressivist semantics of normative language. Since Clark & Dudrick present non-cognitivism as a
view about discourse, I will couch the points in linguistic terms.
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accepted a cognitivist error theory inHuman, All-Too-Human, he rejected this view
in favor of non-cognitivism by the time of theGay Science. Their principal evidence
for this comes fromcertain passages in theGay Science—inparticular, the selections
from GS 299 and 301 examined in §§1–4. Our previous discussions cast doubt on
ascribing non-cognitivism to Nietzsche on the basis of these passages.
Non-cognitivism is a semantic view about the conventional contents of norma-
tive claims, and, likewise, the nature of normative beliefs. As contemporary devel-
opments have underscored,22 this semantic thesis is neutral on questions about the
nature of normative properties. Indeed, a central aim of many non-cognitivists—
so-called “quasi-realists”—has been to show how non-cognitivism is compatible
with accepting the attitude-independence of value. The non-cognitivist needn’t say
that we make “things beautiful, attractive, and desirable when they are not”; or
that “the passions constitute ‘all that has given color to existence’ ”; or that the new
philosophers “create values… in part by inducing in people new affective responses
to things” (Clark & Dudrick 2007: 203, 212; cf. Leiter 2008: 5). Evidence that Ni-
etzsche took there to be some connection between motivational attitudes and eval-
uative judgments isn’t sufficient for treating him as a non-cognitivist. As we have
seen, the questions of principal interest to Nietzsche aren’t semantic questions, but
questions about the nature and grounds of value (§§3–4).
Clark & Dudrick’s main motivation for pursuing a non-cognitivist interpreta-
tion is a desire to avoid attributing an implausible “subjectivism” to Nietzsche (e.g.,
2007: 205). Subjectivism accepts attitude-dependence: it treats value as grounded in
psychological properties of agents. Yet the kinds of subjectivist theories under con-
sideration—not just by Clark & Dudrick, but also in the broader literature—have
been crude. As we saw in our preliminary discussion of constructivism, a subjec-
tivist view needn’t identify what is valuable with what an agent happens to value.
And it needn’t treat all evaluative claims on a par.23 There are more sophisticated
ways of capturing the dependence of value on evaluative attitudes that avoids these
counterintuitive consequences (Silk 2015b).
6 Conclusion
Let’s recap. We started with an interpretive puzzle concerning how to reconcile Niet-
zsche’s apparent systematic rejection of evaluative claims, on the one hand, with his
22E.g., Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003.
23For similar attributions, see also Nehamas 1985, Langsam 1997, Leiter 2002, Richardson 2004,
Reginster 2006, Katsafanas 2011.
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engagement in evaluative discourse and injunctions to create values, on the other.
Examining this apparent tension in Nietzsche’s overall evaluative perspective has
led us to consider a range of normative and metanormative issues— for instance,
concerning the nature of value, the metaphysics of normative properties, the con-
nection between value and evaluative attitudes, the justification of normative beliefs,
the psychology of motivational and evaluative attitudes, and the semantics of nor-
mative language. Delineating these issues can help clarify the nature and extent of
Nietzsche’s metaethical commitments. For instance, while Nietzsche likely didn’t
have worked out views on the semantics of evaluative language, he certainly did
have views on the nature of value. That Nietzsche didn’t have a complete metaethi-
cal theory needn’t keep us from ascribing to him metaethical views.
Specifically, I argued that there are good reasons for ascribing to Nietzsche an
account of normative properties as fundamentally attitude-dependent. On the con-
structivist interpretation outlined here, some things are genuinely valuable, but their
value is grounded in facts about creatures’ evaluative attitudes; thus by coming to
value new things, the new philosophers can create new genuine values. Accepting
the attitude-dependence of value, and appreciating the affective roots of their eval-
uative commitments, the free spirits can avoid practical nihilism and endorse new
life-affirming values.
A nuanced understanding of the space of metaethical possibilities brings into
relief plausible normative and metanormative views we can attribute to Nietzsche.
Yet there is still much work to be done. For instance, even if it is correct to inter-
pret Nietzsche as accepting some sort of attitude-dependent account of value and
normativity, the details of such an interpretation have been largely underexplored.
The sketch of a constructivist interpretation in §4 raises many questions. How ex-
actly are different types of normative properties grounded in evaluative attitudes?
Whose attitudes matter? What is the psychological nature of the relevant evaluative
attitudes? Why should we think these attitudes are suitable for grounding genuine
value? Can we capture Nietzsche’s epistemic constraints on value while respecting
its attitude-dependent status? Is anything in Nietzsche’s view of interest to contem-
porary theorizing? (See Silk 2015b for initial developments.) Further, for concrete-
ness I focused primarily on certain metaphysical aspects of Nietzsche’s metaethics,
largely ignoring his views on the epistemology of value and the psychology of eval-
uative judgment. Integrating Nietzsche’s metaethics with his normative ethics, epis-
temology, and philosophical psychology, as well as with contemporary literatures
on these subjects, promises fruitful avenues to explore.
As I hope our preliminary discussion indicates, there is much to be gained in in-
vestigating Nietzsche’s metaethics. Examining Nietzsche’s views on value and nor-
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mativity provides yet another example of the complexity and synthesis of his over-
all philosophical and evaluative perspective. Nietzsche might not have made it to
the “heyday of analytic metaethics” (Darwall et al. 1992). But that doesn’t mean he
wasn’t ahead of his time.
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